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We also like to recall those grand moments in
which judges upheld the prinCiples of liberty and
democracy in the face of authoritarian government.
In 1879, when a part of the Cape Colony was in a
state of rebellion, a Griqua chief and his son, suspected
by the government of instigating rebellion, had been
unlawfully detained. The chief justice, Sir John Henry
de Villiers, granted their petition for habeas corpus.
He strongly rejected the government's contention
that this action would foment further disturbances:
It is said the country is in such an unsettled state, and

the applicants are reputed to be of such a dangerous
character, that the Court oUght not to exercise a power
which under ordinary circumstances might be usefully
and properly exercised. The disturbed state of the country
oUght not in my opinion to influence the Court, for its
first and most sacred duty is to administer justice to
those who seek it, and not to preserve the peace of
the country. If a different argument were to prevail, it
might so happen that injustice towards individual
natives has disturbed and unsettled a whole tribe, and
the Court would be prevented from removing the very
cause which produced the disturbance. 1

ecently; while standing at the library checkout counter, a student noticed the journal
in my hand. He pondered for a moment,
then offered this reflection: "Hmmm-the
South African Law Journal; isn't that an oxymoron?"
I am not sure he quite appreciated how complex his
rhetorical question really was.
South African lawyers have always been proud of
the rich blend of Roman-Dutch and Anglo-American
common law that constitutes their legal system. We
like to believe our judges have taken the best from each
to build a body of contractual, delict (tort), property;
criminal and commercial law doctrine that is sophisticated, rich and flexible.
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Soon afterwards the chief justice issued another
writ of habeas corpus, and he was then able to observe
with satisfaction that "none of the disastrous consequences which were confidently predicted [by the
Crown in the earlier case] ever ensued."2
Nearly two decades later the judiciary in the old
South African Republic, now the Transvaal, clashed
head-on with both President Kruger and the Trekker
Parliament. The Court, quoting (in Dutch translation!)
from Alexander Hamilton's Federalist No. 78 and from
John Marshall's opinion in Marbury v: Madison,J
declared a resolution unconstitutional,4 thereby precipitating a constitutional crisis which was resolved
only by the eventual departure of the Chief Justice
for another South African bench.
Much later, South Africa's highest court, the Appellate
Division, took a heroic stand against parliament and
the executive when the new Nationalist government
attempted-successfully in the end-to disenfranchise
non-white voters in the 1950's.5 In the process the
court attracted international admiration.
But the South African courts have more recently
acquired a different reputation. To some South Africans
and many foreign observers, the legal system now seems
a grotesque parody of everything Western lawyers v:alue.
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South African lawyers have always been
proud of the rich blend of RomanDutch and Anglo-American common
law that constitutes their legal system.
we like to believe our judges have
taken the best from each to build a
body of contractual, delict (tort),
property, criminal and commercial
law doctrine that is sophisticated,
rich and flexible.
Critics have used various epithets: "quintessentially
unjust," "wicked," "repressive."6 Inn Fuller once used
South African legislation to illustrate his thesis that
legislation lacking certain moral characteristics could
not be described as "law" at all. 7 A fact-fmding team
of the International Commission of Jurists recently
announced that "the 'judges' presence on the bench
lent 'undeserved credibility' to a legal system in which
personal and political freedom was left unprotected;"8
and some jurists have called upon the judges to
resign from the bench.
There are a number of reasons. First, the South
African government has used sweeping, often draconian,
legislation as the primary means of articulating and
implementing the policy of apartheid. The constitutional model that was adopted in South Africa is that
of parliamentary government. The executive is theoretically accountable to parliament; in practice, however,
it has been able, through the party system and a
permanent parliamentary majority, to gain full control
over the legislature. With one trivial exception (relating to the official languages), the Republic constitution contains no protection of human rights; these
can be infringed by ordinary act of parliament. It
therefore fails to operate as a significant restraint. Unlike
their American counterparts, judges cannot strike
down acts of the "sovereign" parliament. They are
confmed to interpreting and applying this legislation.
Second, the government has attempted to foreclose
the remaining avenues of review insofar as administrative rules, orders, and actions are concerned. Although
theoretically subject to judicial review (for want of
compliance with the relevant act of parliament), the
governing statutes have themselves frequently contained provisions purporting, in the clearest possible
terms, to preclude any judicial review whatsoever.
One of the most explicit examples is section 29 of
the Internal Security Act,9 which reads: "No court of
law shall have jurisdiction to pronounce upon the
Validity of any action taken in terms of this section,
or to order the release of any person detained in
terms of the provisions of this section." Provisions

such as these led one jurist to liken the role of the
South African judiciary to that of an umpire who has
been stripped of the power to rule on all the essential
aspects of the ball game.10
The executive also controls the appointment of
judges, all of whom, with one recent exception,11 are
white. Unlike the lower magistracy, which is staffed
entirely by employees of the Department of Justice,
the judges of the Supreme Court do enjoy security of
tenure until the mandatory retirement age of 70, but
it is inevitable that the appointment power should
influence the character of the judiciary to some
degree. In 1955, after the government had suffered a
series of adverse decisions in the Appellate Division,
the size of the court was increased to enable the
government to add six judges to the five then Sitting.
These factors, coupled with the fact that the government has remained in power for nearly forty years,
led to the creation of a judiciary that displayed meek
acquiescence in the face of an increasingly draconian
body of apartheid and security legislation.
During the 1960's and 1970's the role of the courts
as protectors of liberty and equality reached its nadir.
In a manner reminiscent of some judges during the
slavery era in the United States,12 the South African
judiciary protested their inability to ameliorate the
harshness of the legislation they were called on to
apply. The most notorious example was Minister of
the Interior v. Lockhat, 13 where the court had been
asked to rule that group areas legislation (which requires
that land be demarcated for exclusive use by members
of one race group) should be applied in a manner
that did not have disparate impact as between races.
Notwithstanding the existence of an important
precedent to this effect,14 Holmes JA, speaking for
the unanimous court, concluded that
[t]he Group Areas Act represents a colossal social experiment and a long term policy. It necessarily involves the
movement out of Group Areas of numbers of people
throughout the country. Parliament must have envisaged that compulsory population shifts of persons
occupying certain areas would inevitably cause disruption and, within the foreseeable future, substantial
inequalities. Whether all this will ultimately prove to be
for the common weal of all the inhabitants is not for
the Court to decide. 15

Even where statutes were vague, judges seemed to
have little difficulty filling in the details, thereby
intensifying the harshness of their application. An
illustration is Rossouw v. Sachs, 16 where the Appellate
Division ruled that a detainee was entitled to no
more daily exercise or reading material than that
officially permitted, even though the relevant act of
parliament was silent on this point and despite the
existence of precedent to the effect that a prisoner
awaiting trial retains whatever rights the empowering
legislation does not expressly take away.17 By a spectacular piece of anti-libertarian reasoning, Ogilvie

VOL. 5, NO.2 / 11

Thompson JA took the view that since the statute
already constituted a drastic inroad into traditional
principles of South African criminal procedure, one
had to assume that it also intended to eliminate all
residual rights of detainees other than the right to
basic "necessities"!18
A leading South African jurist has concluded that
"the Supreme Court, since 1950 when the total onslaught on freedom and legality began, has failed
(with some exceptions) to protect individual liberty,
to understand and apply the requirements of due
process, to check or restrain arbitrary action and to
speak resolutely against uncivilized and sometimes
barbarous official behavior."19
Casual observers might be tempted to conclude
that the South African legal system not only fails to
protect the vast majority of South Africans but actively
facilitates the imposition and maintenance of apartheid.
Like the legal systems of Nazi Germany and various
other totalitarian regimes of recent history, it must be
a gigantic and tragic farce. 20 But such a conClusion
would be too facile. Not only does it depend upon
simplistic analogies and a narrowly segmented view of
the legal system which overlooks large areas of the law
that are almost untainted by apartheid legislation, but
it also fails to take into account the fact that thousands
of black South Africans, including most of those who
are politically sophisticated and of radical persuasion,
regularly resort to the courts in an attempt to challenge
various facets of apartheid. It overlooks the fact that
many (black and White) South African lawyers, possessing
impeccable democratic and human rights credentials,
regard the legal system as providing at least a partial
protection against the onslaught of apartheid.
Most important of all, such a conclusion does not
square with the dramatic judicial about-turn that has
occurred during the past five years. This truly remarkable development merits some description since it
has been little noticed or understood in the United
States. 21 How, I am often asked, can judges do much
in a system that has the features I have briefly described?
Faced by a sovereign, executive-controlled parliament, no bill of rights, powers delegated to officials
and the police in far-reaching terms and protected
by a web of unreviewability clauses, what could the
judges really do to protect individual rights and political expreSSion, even if they wanted to? The answer
is, quite a lot. But it requires a major shift in judicial
attitude-a shift in which Duke Law School can claim
a small part!
As the pro-apartheid attitude of the Appellate
Division became clear during the 1960's, a few South
African jurists began to level criticism at the judges
for their failure to apply presumptions of interpretation that were more favorable to individuals than to
the government. Among the most prominent of the
critics was John Dugard, a former visiting professor
at Duke Law School and presently professor of law at

During the 1960's and 1970's the role
of the courts as protectors of liberty
and equality reached its nadir. In a
manner reminiscent of some judges
during the slavery era in the United
States, the South African judiciary
protested their inability to ameliorate
the harshness of the legislation they
were called on to apply.
the University of the Witwatersrand and Director of
its Center for Applied Legal Studies. During visits to
the United States he had been impressed by the
success of the civil rights movement in the courts.
Of course, the United States Constitution was central
to the movement's strategy, and South Africa lacks a
counterpart. But Dugard was also influenced by the
views of the American legal realists, from whom he
learned that judges enjoy a much greater range of
choice in the characterization of evidence and the
construction of statutes than they are often prepared
to admit. He began to advocate the persistent resort
to the courts in South Africa as a means of resisting
government action. In 1974, while visiting at Duke,
he wrote the bulk of his most important work,
Human Rights and the South African Legal Order;22 a
comprehensive study and critique of the role of the
South African judiciary in the maintenance of human
rights in South Africa.
Criticisms such as those leveled by Dugard and
others at first enraged the judges. They were met with
stern reproach from the ChiefJustice. 23 One outspoken
critic, the late Barend van Niekerk, was actually twice
prosecuted for contempt of court.24 But some judges
gradually began to respond. Towards the end of the
1970's, and especially since about 1983, a few started
handing down decisions in the field of race and security
legislation that were surprisingly adverse to the government. A Natal judge, setting aside an influx control
order that had been issued against an African who
had been deemed "idle and undesirable," severely
criticized the legislation concerned in terms that attracted
considerable local publicity 25 A judge in the Transkei
granted habeas corpus to a detainee who had been held
under broadly-couched security legislation. Echoing
Sir Henry de Villiers, he declared that "the criteria
[for] ascertaining the intention of a statute do not
differ according to the relative tranquility or disruption of a community, but remain the same."26
This trickle of judicial resistance has since become
a flow that even the two states of emergency, accompanied by regulations that are breathtaking in their
sweep, have failed to stem. At all levels and in most
provincial jurisdictions of the Supreme Court, judges
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have declared executive action under widely-framed
statutes governing forced removals,27 pass law violations28 and influx controF9 to be illegal. In 1982 they
effectively paralyzed the South African government's
attempt to denationalize almost a million blacks by
transferring their residential areas to an independent
country, Swaziland. 30 An order of the State President
requiring removal of a black tribe from its ancestral
home against its will was declared unlawful, notwithstanding the fact that in 1975 the South African Parliament
had attempted by resolution to validate his action in
advance.31 The administration of influx control was
severely hampered by a series of decisions that imposed
liberal constructions upon the narrow statutory rights
of residence enjoyed by Africans living in urban areas;32
these decisions have affected the lives of thousands,

This trickle ofjudicial resistance has
since become a flow that even the two
states of emergenc.M accompanied by
by regulations that are breathtaking in
their sweep) have failed to stem.
and potentially hundreds of thousands, of African
urban dwellers, and the government was eventually
compelled to repeal the governing legislation. 33 A
series of decisions of the Transvaal Provincial Division
has also effectively brought to a halt prosecutions of
blacks living in white areas in violation of group
areas legislation. 34
Most striking of all has been the judicial response
in litigation involving the actions of the police and
security forces, under both the permanent security
legisiation3S and the states of emergency36 Even in
strong democracies, such as Britain and the United
States, the courts have a predictable tendency to defer
to the executive at times of national crisis. 37 Nor should
we assume that this occurs only at a time of war/ 8
the contrary is amply illustrated by recent cases in
both Britain39 and the United States. 40
Yet it is in the area of state security that the activism
of the South African courts has been greatest. In Natal,
the Eastern Cape, the Transvaal and Namibia, in the
Appellate Division and in other provincial jurisdictions,
judges have rendered ineffective the most broadly
phrased unreviewability clauses in the South African
statute book. Though expressly forbidden to review
the lawfulness of police action in detaining individuals
or to grant writs of habeas corpus and related remedies,
they have done so repeatedly and have ordered the
release of numerous detainees. 41 The courts have
literally interpreted the preclusionary clauses, including
the one quoted in this article, out of existence. 42
Employing expansive canons of construction and
drawing on common law presumptions of statutory

interpretation, the courts have rejected as inadequate
the provision by the government of sham or "skeleton"
reasons for detentions (in other words, mere regurgitations of the empowering statutory clauses), 43 and in
some cases have imposed fair hearing requirements
even where the legislation seemed not to contemplate
that these should be observed. 44 They have ordered
prison officials to allow detainees access to legal advisers
in the face of regulations to the contrary.4S
Using the technique of strict construction, judges
in Natal and the Transvaal have rejected certificates
presented by the Attorney-General purporting to prohibit the granting of bail to persons charged with
security offenses. 46 In a particularly outrageous instance
of police intimidation, the traditional protection of
attorney-client privilege was reinforced when a court
ruled illegal the police's seizure on warrant of a written
statement taken from a witness by a firm of attorneys
acting for the wife of a detainee who had died while
under arrest. The court very strictly construed the
ostensibly-broad wording of the warrant. 47
Some judges have begun to subject official action
to vigorous, "hard look" review. In Natal, the Western
and Eastern Cape and the Transvaal they have set aside
banning orders placed upon individuals,48 meetings 49
and funerals so by officials acting under broadly-phrased
security legislation. In Natal, especially, they have ameliorated the draconian scope of the statutory offenses
against the state, which have been used to harass opponents of the government, by imposing tough procedural
and evidential requirements,Sl by restricting the scope
of the offensess2 and by inserting a requirement of
subjective, specific mens rea where the wording of
the provisions has remotely permitted. S3
They have also become more receptive to allegations of maltreatment. Courts around the country have
upheld claims of torture by ex-detaineess4 and have
issued interdicts SS to the extent that the government
has been driven, in many cases, to release detainees s6
and settle damages claims out of court for fear of permitting yet further adverse precedents to be created. s7
Some judges have adapted a remedy, derived from
English commercial law, which authorizes the preemptive search, without notice, of a police station or
prison for the purpose of obtaining evidence relating
to allegations of torture or maltreatment. 58
The government seems to have assumed that by
imposing a state of emergency and suspending the operation of the meager safeguards of Parliamentary legisla-

Even in strong democracies) such as
Britain and the United States) the
courts have a predictable tendency to
defer to the executive at times of
national crisis.
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tion it would avoid embarrassment and obstruction
in the courts. After all, a state of emergency, like martial
law, is usually thought to suspend, in practice if not
in theory, the jurisdiction of the courts. But here too
judicial protection has not been entirely eliminated.
Various courts have ruled sections of the emergency
proclamations affecting detainees, 59 the press,60 freedom
of expression,61 and public gatherings62 invalid. Under
the second state of emergency (imposed in June of
1986) there had already been 218 court applications
against the validity of the declared state of emergency
itself, or actions taken under it, by late September of
1986!63
These decisions have forced the government to
amend and tighten the wording of the emergency procand associated regulations under the glare of
mternational publicity and without ever being sure that
it has plugged all the gaps. And now, having created
an unwieldy tricameral parliamentary system in which
South Africans of Indian descent and of mixed race
have a limited role, the government can no longer rely
on the speedy assistance of a compliant "sovereign"
legislature to validate its illegalities; instead it has been
forced, after fIrst having to wait until Parliament actually is in session, frustratedly to coax unwilling legislators, many of whom have resorted to dilatory tactics
to stall legislative amendments. 64
The full implications of the cases described here
as well as their overall impact, require much fuller
nation and should not be exaggerated. There have also
been a signifIcant number of decisions in favor of the
government, and judicial activism is probably still confmed to a minority of judges. There are still a number
of judges who appear to be adopting the views and
attitudes of their counterparts of the 1960's and 1970's;
some have meted out savage sentences to youthful
protesters; the notorious Delmas treason trial proceeds
in the Transvaal.
Even so, the mere existence of contrary decisions,
let alone their actual number, is remarkable. This raises
a wide range of questions concerning the constitutionalist and interpretive theories that might explain these
decisions. It reminds us of the obvious but frequently
forgotten
that judges, having once acquired tenure,
often surpnse those who appointed them. More importantly, it demonstrates the complexity of the lengthy
debate among liberal South African legal scholars over
the appropriate role of judges in an unjust society and
whether they should resign. The legal system and the
judiciary cannot simply be dismissed as a reflection
of the apartheid state, nor can the decisions surveyed
here be fairly described as "occasional judicial expostulations in the name of justice" or "faint voices in the
T
w ilderness."65 l.A1.ge
numb ers of real people are enjoying
the benefIts of these "expostulations."
The impact of "liberal" decision-making in South
Africa may still be dwarfed by the larger political events.
It is unrealistic to assume that the judiciary can be an
important agent for the abolition of apartheid itself.

exanti-

The government seems to have assumed
that by imposing a state of emergency
and suspending the operation of the
meager safeguards of Parliamentary
legislation it would avoid embarrassment and obstruction in the courts.
After all} a state of
like
martial law, is usually thought to
suspend} in practice if not in theory,
the jurisdiction of the courts.
The most the judges can do is serve to reduce the oppression, help to protect the agents of political change,
and display the virtue of an independent judiciary to
South Africa's future rulers. Perhaps in the end, through
a combination of increasingly vicious reactions on
the part of the government, exhaustion on the part
of some judges and recalcitrance on the part of others,
every ember of judicial protection will be snuffed
out.
Nevertheless, we should not underestimate the significance of judicial resistance. The judiciary enjoys immense
prestige and credibility in the eyes of most whites, and
the business community could not function without
it. To this extent, therefore, it is a branch of government
that is very diffIcult to subordinate, which, through its
very actions and criticism, can help further to erode
the monolithic power base upon which the government presently relies. Parliament could theoretically
abolish the courts altogether, or render judges removable at the whim of the executive. Or the government
could just ignore their decisions. 66 But until this has
happened, what the South African judges have been
doing to resist apartheid, what they can and should
be doing, and whether they should collectively resign
are issues that demand much more complex analysis
than has hitherto been accorded them in the United
States.
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